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Abstract:
Arthur Danto’s analytic theory of art relies on a form of artistic interpretation that requires access
to the art theoretical concepts of the artworld, ‘an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge
of the history of art: an artworld’. Art, in what Danto refers to as post-history, has become
theoretical, yet it is here contended that his explanation of the artist’s creative style lacks a
theoretical dimension. This article examines Danto’s account of style in light of the role the
artistic metaphor plays in the interpretation of the artwork, arguing that it is unable to account
for the metaphorical power he claims is embedded within the work of art. An artist’s style issues
from a unique perspective, the way an artist inhabits a specific spot in history. Though each person
has such a perspective, when applied aesthetically, it is the key to the articulation of a unique
historical meaning in the work of art. At the same time, artists’ knowledge of their contribution
remains cut off from this perspective, for they are unaware of their self-manifestation of the
historical concept of style. This article makes the case that Danto’s notion of style, based on
Sartre’s notion of being-for-itself, cannot fulfil the role he allots it in his theory because, at some
level, artists must apprehend their style to create a work of art capable of functioning critically as
a countertext. It is only through the apprehension of their style, and dialogical activity that takes
place between the artist and the beholders, that the unseen body of artworld theory is formed.
Without this, when oriented to the aesthetic, style provides no concept or theory for the mind
to behold. This article presents an alternative approach to style that recognizes the role of theory
in the creation of metaphor, which would circumvent this problem.
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The Imperceptibility of Style
In Transfiguration of the Commonplace, the late Arthur Danto (1924–2013) wrote that
‘[t]o understand the artwork is to grasp the metaphor that is, I think, always there’
(Danto 1981: 172). For Danto, ‘the greatest metaphors of art’ are ‘those in which the
spectator identifies himself with the attributes of the represented character: and sees
his or her life in terms of the life depicted’. When the artwork is experienced as such,
‘the artwork becomes a metaphor for life and life is transfigured’ (172). This revelation
follows from a reinterpretation of one’s sense data when an object is perceived as
an object of art. The commonplace is ‘transfigured’ when the framework of artistic
intention is applied to everyday sensual phenomenon, apprehending it as if it were
art, instead of the quotidian. The artist’s intention that something be art, embedded
within the artwork, opens up a new interpretive dimension, one that challenges or
reconfigures the underlying phenomenon on which it is based. The moment that drives
this revelatory process is, for Danto, the metaphor. The artwork itself is the catalyst for
the transformative process that the metaphor makes possible, but the locus is somehow
elsewhere, for it involves the creative intentions of the artist, the interpretation of the
beholder, and the meaning of the times, which enters the work through the artist’s
style. In what Danto calls the era of ‘post-historical’ art, all styles are equal, and
art can take any form. What differentiates the artwork from the everyday in post-
history, what provides the cues showing that an object embodies an interpretable
metaphor – differentiating it from an everyday object – is found in the body of artistic
theory and concepts he calls the ‘artworld’ (Danto 1964). In the era of post-history,
the artworld becomes a countertext of sorts. It is through the artistic metaphor that
the engagement occurs. But the structure of the artworld, external to the individual
work, is the theoretical means through which the artwork is interpreted when art,
in the era after art, is no longer representational. Danto understands the artworld,
in a somewhat Hegelian manner, to be a set of concepts that emerges according to
the inner logic of aesthetic history. While agreeing with Danto’s account of art as the
embodiment of artistic intention, and his claim that the creative metaphor is the key
to artistic transfiguration, I find his account of the artworld one-dimensional. If the
artworld is not formed through a dialogue among artists and beholders, I fail to see
how his account of metaphor can fulfil its task. The key to the metaphor’s power to
transfigure comes from having great style. However, the account of style that Danto
gives, in which the artist is blind to her style, is at the root of the artworld’s one-
dimensionality.
Danto’s analytic theory of art relies on a form of artistic interpretation that requires
access to the art theoretical concepts of the artworld. In post-history, ‘to see something
as art requires something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a
knowledge of the history of art: an artworld’ (Danto 1964: 580). The observation
that the pluralistic world of contemporary art is inextricably bound to theory stems
from a revelation Danto had on seeing Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. Art, in Danto’s eyes, had
become theoretical, yet his explanation of the artist’s creative style lacks a theoretical
dimension. The artist’s intention, drawn from the narrative meaning of history, endows
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the artwork with meaning. The narrative meaning of history is something akin to the
Zeitgeist, or spirit of the times. In a narrative construction, it carries within it the way
that the people of a certain historical place and time perceive the world. The artists’
style is their unique perspective, the way they inhabit a specific spot in the space-time
continuum. Each person has such a perspective (Danto 2007a),1 but when applied
aesthetically, it is the key to the articulation of a unique historical meaning in the
work of art. At the same time, artists’ knowledge of their contribution remains cut off
from this perspective, for they are unaware of their self-manifestation of the historical
concept of style. Here, I examine Danto’s account of style in light of the role the
artistic metaphor plays in the interpretation of the artwork, arguing that it is unable
to account for the metaphorical power he claims is embedded within the work of art.
I make the case that his notion of style cannot fulfil the role he allots it in his theory,
and suggest an alternative approach that recognises the role of theory in the creation of
metaphor. Below, I discuss the role of metaphor in the artwork, and Danto’s account of
style, making the case that artists must, at some level, apprehend their style to create
a work of art capable of functioning critically as a countertext. It is only through the
apprehension of their style, and dialogical activity that takes place between the artist
and the beholders, that the unseen body of artworld theory is formed. Without this,
when oriented to the aesthetic, style provides no concept or theory for the mind to
behold.
The problem I address in Danto’s theory can be summarised as follows: Danto
employs a notion of style that requires, at some level, theoretical activity on the part of
the artist. Danto defines the artwork such that it necessitates the activity of the viewer.
‘To seek a neutral description is to see the work as a thing and hence not as an artwork:
it is analytical to the concept of an artwork that there has to be an interpretation’
(Danto 1981: 124). While this claim makes clear that art’s existence is underwritten
by a hermeneutic practice, Danto deliberately draws a stark line between the task of
philosophy and the task of art – art’s essential definition and its historical practice.
The offshoot of this is that Danto views art criticism and interpretation as a non-
philosophical activity, even if philosophically mandated. As noted above, Danto argues
that the active component of art is akin to metaphor. This moment, which lends art
the power to be something more than its medium of articulation, has an effect on par
with that of rhetoric. Danto lays out a two-phased process of artistic creation. Through
their style, artists are able to grasp the meaning manifest in history and embody it in
their art. The style of the person has an analogue in the style of history:
[I]n art particularly, it is this external physiognomy of an inner system of representation
that I wish to claim style refers to. Of course we speak as well of the style of a period or
a culture, but this will refer us ultimately to shared representational modes which define
what it is to belong to a period. (Danto 1981: 205)
The artists’ style manifests a representation of a world both individual and cultural.
Their style, impervious to them is, nonetheless, visible to others, and through the
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beholder’s interpretation of the externalisation of that inner-world, artworks are
actualised, so to speak.
The artist’s style, used to craft the metaphor that makes the work of art successful,
for Danto, works in a manner similar to rhetoric. However, Danto’s definition of
style, as I aim to show, fails to provide the artwork with the power of rhetoric, for,
if nothing else, rhetoric is a carefully aimed tool. If there is a lack of awareness in
the process of artistic creation and interpretation, it is with the audience intuitively
filling in what is missing. The activity of rhetoricians, who know well the ellipsis the
audience should complete, is not blind to the context of their world. As I argue below,
Danto’s narrative theory of art entails a rich notion of metaphor. Nonetheless, the role
metaphor plays in the realisation of artistic engagement is only sustainable if his account
of style acknowledges the interaction between creator and beholder that must exist
when the artwork’s intention comes into being. Nonetheless, this theoretical attitude,
implicit in the style of artists, is not limited to knowledge of their craft and their
audience. It is also present in the transmission of the artistic intention, an interactive
process initiated with the audience. Unlike rhetoric, which aims to manipulate, this
process furthers the beholder’s understanding of the cultural schemata the artist uses
to communicate, and in this sense it is philosophical.
Essentialist definition of art. Despite his grounding in the tradition of analytic
philosophy, Danto’s theory of art draws heavily on the aesthetics of Hegel.2 It was
Hegel’s assertion that the artwork was the material incarnation of spirit’s historical
striving for truth. Incorporating this aspect of Hegel’s aesthetic theory directly into his
essentialist definition of art, Danto argues that all art of all times could be construed
as embodied meaning. He understands the artwork to have two necessary attributes.
First, it must have material form, and second, the material form must incorporate
the meaningful intention of the artist. In agreement with Hegel, Danto’s aesthetic
theory requires that the meanings of the artworks be connected through a historically
indexed notion of style. The historical indexing of style ensures that artworks can be
interpreted through the progressively emerging concepts of the artworld. Danto views
contemporary art as an infinitely pluralistic style of making styles. In the post-historical
world of art, no style is better than any other. It is Danto’s understanding that, in our
time, the story of art has closed, which leads to his claim that the ‘era of art’ is over.
The culture of contemporary art allows that all styles are available to artists, though
none can be inhabited as they were by the artists of past eras. Because the style of
each period is historically indexed, in Danto’s view, artworks entail temporally unique
metaphors. Though the meanings of the artistic metaphors shift across time, they are,
nonetheless, interpretable because they are understood through the legacy of artworld
theories.
Though Danto draws on a Hegelian model, he is critical of Hegel’s teleological
notion of substantial, or universal, history. Danto bases his theory on the analytic
model of historical narrative, which he pioneered in Analytical Philosophy of History. To
explain his theory, Danto uses the example of the Thirty Years’ War. In 1618 it could
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not have been stated that ‘the Thirty Years’ War has begun’. Only from the perspective
of future historians, after the war’s completion, could one make reference to the Thirty
Years’ War. According to Danto, when narrative historical models are employed, the
narrative structure is only useful when looking backward (2007a: 152). Thus, any
attempt to project a historical theory into the future is little more than ‘prophecy’.
Danto views the projects of all substantial philosophers of history as flawed, for they
make claims about the future that utilise knowledge of a universal history they cannot
possibly have. The universal perspective relies on a theory that conceives of history as
a rationally discernible whole. The philosopher, as they see it, has privileged access to
the theoretical totality, and based on the rational consistency of the historical whole,
can ‘peek’ into the future. Danto agrees that history is formed based on theories, or
the ‘interests’ of the historian (2007a: 142). As mentioned above, these are only valid
when looking back at a set of events to which a narrative explanation is applied. As a
consequence, utilising one’s current narrative structure to anticipate a possible future
is invalid. This aspect of Danto’s essentialist / narrative account of art has ramifications
insofar as he postulates that the artist is blind to what is at the root of aesthetic meaning.
In terms of the artwork’s embodiment of meaning, Danto’s theory of artistic creation
mirrors that of Hegel, who viewed artists as vehicles of spirit, creating works that
embody a form of truth beyond their immediate understanding. But if Danto disallows
a substantial account of history, which has universal meaning embedded within it,
the theoretical perspective that endows the work with meaning cannot be blindly
bestowed on the work of art. Without the Hegelian spirit-of-the-times, the artist
must create the meaning, and the unselfconscious nature of the relationship that artists
have to their artworks does not adequately clarify the theoretical perspective that is
bound to the style of post-history. On one level, I agree that artists might not be
aware of the manner of their time. However, though it was not Danto’s intention,
his understanding of artistic creation, rooted in the artist’s style, places limits on
the possibility of theoretical reflection occurring in the interchange between artist
and audience. This interchange should be an iterative loop, with the artist reflecting
upon the feedback of the audience, thereby incorporating new stylistic features into
new work. The alternative model represents an option for art to play an active
and critical role in the reproduction of culture. However, if artists are unaware of
their style, drawing unreflectively on their inner system of representation, then the
critical feedback mechanism is truncated, lessening the potential to advance a critical
hermeneutic dialogue.
Style. Plato is critical of the rhapsode Ion, whose Homeric renderings far surpass
the efforts of others. Despite this ability when reciting other poets, Ion’s performance
is lacking. Thus, Socrates claims that the ‘song stitcher’ is ‘unable to speak on Homer
with art and knowledge [ – techne¯ and episteme]’, for Ion can neither
explain nor reproduce the quality of his Homeric recitations (Plato 1960: 532c).
It is Plato’s aim to convince us that art is either a distorted copy of the real or
irrational incantations. Without accepting the conclusions of Plato’s critique of art,
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Danto acknowledges the claim that Ion recites without ‘knowledge or art’ (1981:
198–201). Socrates concludes that Ion’s inexplicable ability issues not from craft but
from divine power.
For the poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable to indite until he has
been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him . . . . For not by
art do they utter these things, but by divine influence; since, if they had fully learnt by art
to speak on one kind of theme, they would know how to speak on all. (Plato 1960: 534b)
Danto agrees that this ability is not a craft, for it cannot be learned. It is a gift, the gift
of style.
Style, for Danto, encompasses the ability to apprehend directly what others intuit
indirectly. Those who do not possess style must imitate. Imitators can acquire a manner
by learning, but only by imitating those with style. Thus, when one has learned the
manner of style, one ‘knows’ in a mediated fashion, whereas the one who manifests
style prehends it in an unmediated way. Artists like Ion, who demonstrate an innate
sense of style, are unable to explain their talent, for they are in possession of something
akin to divine dispensation.
Danto defines style as the physiognomic self-representation of the artist. This
representation, imperceptible to artists, is nonetheless perceptible to the audience.
Style, for artists, is a manifestation of the way they view and inhabit the world,
something of which they are not conscious. This notion of unconscious style seems to
be drawn from Sartre, from whom Danto acknowledges he has learned much (Danto
1975: 12). Danto is looking at Sartre’s unique understanding of being-for-itself and
for-others, être-pour-soi and être-pour-autrui, when he defines the impenetrable nature
of one’s own style (Danto 1981: 10–11). Referring to Sartre’s discussion of language’s
inability to apprehend actual existence, he writes:
In the light of what had heretofore been deemed a necessary condition for language to
represent the world, it would entail the view that since this condition fails, language
cannot represent the world at all, and that the world as it really is lies beyond the power
of language to say. (1975: 18)
The world itself, something like the inner system of representation that Danto refers
to as style, in Sartre’s account is linguistically off limits. Individuals cannot speak of,
or represent, ‘world’ to others, for they are themselves unaware of it. For Danto, we
perceive the inner-world of others, externally manifest, but only as the flipside of the
imperceptible self that is forever beyond our reach. Thus, for Sartre, one can only
become aware of one’s particular location in existence through the gaze of the other.
Through the look of the other, one becomes aware of oneself. ‘But in perceiving an eye
as looking, I perceive myself as a possible object for that look: I lose my transparency,
as it were, and become opaque even for myself’ (Danto 1975: 117).
This, for Sartre, was hell. ‘The structure of self-consciousness, then, is logically
social, but since I finally am an object for myself only through the provenance of
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others’ perception of me, what I am (as an object) depends upon others and not
upon myself’ (Danto 1975: 120). The opacity, the murky awareness one has when
the imperceptibility of one’s locus in the world fades, is critical to understanding that
the other has a position. To know the self, pour-autrui, is the start of self-reflection and
critique. But style remains at the level of pour-soi.
This notion of style links the artist’s work to its historical context (Danto 1981:
205). Understood thus, the internal perspective cannot be grasped. But the external
version of the inner-self is what makes the artwork interpretable to audiences of that
time, as well as those of the future. This way of colouring the world, embodied within
the work’s medium of presentation, entices the audience to interpret it. Thus, the
essence of the work of art comes through its interpretation, ‘esse is interpretari’, because
the artwork is created such that it must be interpreted (Danto 1981: 125). If the
artwork does not evoke an interpretation, even one of negative evaluation, then it
fails as an artwork. Hence, through the higher powers of intuition extant in their style,
and without direct knowledge of how they do it, artists must create an interpretable
metaphor. I question though, whether a great metaphor can be created so blindly, as a
‘shot in the dark’?
Metaphor and enthymeme. I began with Danto’s claim that ‘[t]o understand
the artwork is to grasp the metaphor that is, I think, always there’ (1981: 172). The
beholders, when encountering the artwork, open the metaphor within the work,
interpreting it within the framework of their own lives. When one can identify
oneself with something placed in the metaphor, perhaps intuiting that the externalised
representation of self, articulated through artistic style, is something that matches
some aspect of one’s own inner-world, it becomes, if not a universal, something
that we all can step into, even if for a moment. When this is achieved ‘the artwork
becomes a metaphor for life and life is transfigured’ (172). Experiencing such a work
is ‘the enactment of a metaphoric transformation’ through which the commonplace is
transfigured into something ‘amazing’ (173).
The role of metaphor in mediating the components of style and rhetoric can be
described as follows: first, the artists’ style, the physiognomy of the self, creates the
metaphor, for ‘metaphors have to be made’ (Danto 1981: 175). Nonetheless, this
process is not a conscious one, for the artists’ style, the consciousness of the world
they embody in their works, is hidden from them. Second, the metaphor manifests
rhetorical characteristics, for its purpose is to provoke the audience, to effect some
feeling in them that completes the artists’ gestures of meaning. The relationship
between the artists and the audience is such that the artists’ intentions, in a rhetorical
fashion, evoke a response from the viewer, completing the metaphorical ellipsis. The
locus of this aesthetic engagement is outside of the work itself, for the work merely
induces a response. For the rhetorician, the intended response is known to the creator.
The artistic expression, on the other hand, leaves open an unbounded space for
interpretation.
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Danto references Aristotle’s discussion of the enthymeme in Rhetoric, suggesting
that the artistic metaphor is similar to the enthymeme, a syllogism with a missing
step.3 Though Aristotle discusses many different forms of the syllogistic enthymeme,
the type that contains a maxim as an unstated part of the syllogism is the form pertinent
to Danto’s discussion (Aristotle 1926: II, 21, 1394a). This implies that the one using
the enthymeme, and Aristotle is clear that its usage is to manipulate the audience, must
have some knowledge of the addressees and their wishes in order to imply an acceptable
maxim in the place of the missing part. The maxim is a general statement that will go
unquestioned by the audience. It is refutable, but it will not be questioned immediately
if the metaphor it employs is neither too far-fetched nor too obvious (Aristotle 1926:
III, 10, 1410b). ‘Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as,
for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; it does not even deal with
all general things . . . but with objects of human action’ (Aristotle 1926: II, 21, 1394a).
The orator must know the audience. The metaphor couched within the maxim must
go unnoticed, compelling the audience to complete the persuasive syllogism without
scrutiny. The maxim will be something like a ‘class-type’, or part of the narrative
of a people that they take for granted. In Narration and Knowledge, Danto gives the
example of the kind person. A kind person will be predictably kind, but exactly how
they will be kind is not predictable. Without the rules behind the class-type being
specifically mentioned, people living in a given place and time will be unaware of this
aspect of their local narrative or inner-world. The rhetorician, however, must know
these customs. Because this information is common to a people, they will assume there
are no ‘general laws’ to be known (Danto 2007a: 223–27). But this is the mistake the
rhetorician takes advantage of, using these ‘rules’ or maxims as the missing step of the
enthymeme. The missing step is completed in the hearer’s mind. The artist’s style, in
some way, will place these ‘pieces’ together, adding a step of which neither artist nor
beholder are explicitly aware, but which is nonetheless filled in through the activity of
the beholder. For this reason, I refer to this process as opaque, for though hidden in
some ways, there is still an implicit inner logic.
It is Danto’s claim that the metaphoric meaning, hidden as it were within the
enthymeme, shares the structure of the metaphor embodied within the artwork.
The rhetorical component in the work of art, though not the exact equivalent of its
linguistic counterpart, functions in much the same way. It is the rhetorical element of
metaphor that transfigures one mode of speech into another. The words retain the same
meaning, but in their usage they acquire new meanings; they are ‘transfigured’ and not
‘transformed’ (Danto 1981: 168). In the form of an enthymeme, the transfiguration
occurs when the listener is made to fill in the gap. The listener is compelled to
make the connection, guided by the rhetorician to fill in the ellipsis. The critical
piece, in Danto’s account, is that Aristotle has ‘identified something crucial: the
middle term has to be found, the gap has to be filled in, the mind moved to action’
(Danto 1981: 171). The metaphor, in Danto’s schema, is a minor work of art.
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It is about words in the same way that an artwork is about things in the real world.
This metaphoric representation exhibits the artwork’s embedded intention. For Danto,
perceiving the contrast in forms of usage is essential because ‘to understand the
artwork is to grasp the metaphor’ within (172). Like the aesthetic metaphor conjured
by the artist for the work of art, the maxim that makes the enthymeme effective is a
gesture or a generalisation specific to a cultural context. Hence, a considerable level of
‘cultural competence’ is needed to implant the metaphoric gesture in the syllogism
(Danto 1981: 177). Like the maxim, which functions within a shifting historical
and cultural context, artistic metaphors can become stale, change, or be forgotten.
It is often necessary, Danto contends, that the metaphors of art require ‘scholarly
resurrection’. Thus, ‘it is the great value of such disciplines as the history of art and
of literature to make such works approachable again (Danto 1981: 174). The world of
metaphor requires a heightened level of cultural competence to access and manipulate;
therefore, if one has no such cultural competence, one will not understand, much
less create, a metaphor. This culturally elevated metaphoric layer is the theoretical
medium of the artworld. In the process of transfiguration, it is Danto’s claim that an
object is detached from reality and placed in another world, a sphere of interpreted
things, manifest with the gesture of metaphor. ‘So it is essential to our study that
we understand the nature of an art theory, which is so powerful a thing as to detach
objects from the real world and make them part of a different world, an art world, a
world of interpreted things’ (Danto 1981: 135). The process of metaphoric creation,
embodiment, and interpretation ‘involves a complex interrelation between the framer
and the reader of the enthymeme (Danto 1981: 170). This indicates that the real
medium of the work of art, what separates it from objects of the everyday, lies in
the interactive medium of human consciousness. The interaction that occurs within
consciousness plays the levels of inner- and external-representations of world, pour-soi
and pour-autrui, off of each other, as text and countertext. Danto argues steadfastly
that the inner-representation of one’s world is off limits to consciousness or critique.
But he makes it clear that when something in one’s inner-representation of world
does not match one’s world, it becomes opaque (2007a: 223). One no longer glides
seamlessly in one’s world. Regarding general laws and customs of a specific culture,
if one is of that culture, one may never need an explanation for a given event. But if
one does not have the cultural competency needed, as an outsider for example, the
world may not be clear – events may need explanation, a rule may become explicit
and opaque. It is this loss of imperceptibility in the rules of art, and the increasing
need for the concepts behind them to be explained, which demands the theoretical
intervention of the artworld (Snyder 2015). But this account of the artworld, the
theoretical account of art’s burgeoning class-type which accepts all objects as art,
does not comport with the unreflective articulation of style. The opacity evokes an
interaction, an interaction that goes beyond the bounds of the conventional audience
and what had been considered the standard forms of art. Danto was correct in noting
this aspect of the post-historical dynamic of the artworld. But this account of metaphor
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stands in contrast to Danto’s notion of style and the inner-world that underwrites it. It
does not accord with his notion of an artworld as a set of unfolding artistic concepts.
Rather, his notion of artistic metaphor demands a dialogue of concepts, provoked
by artistic creation, which is cogent enough to result in the body of theoretical, and
sometimes counter-theoretical, knowledge that sets, or refuses to set, the parameters
for art’s future, while also explaining its past.
Style’s transitive property. Danto’s account of artistic creation and reception
includes style as ‘the relationship between representation and the one who makes
the representation’, and rhetoric ‘concerns the relation between representation and
audience’ (Danto 1981: 198). The gift possessed by Ion is the epitome of what Danto
refers to as style: the unmediated ability to speak the words of Homer in a way that
cannot be learned. Unmediated expression, when embodied in art, provides those who
will interpret the work with the opportunity to experience the stylised incarnation of
artistic consciousness that the artists themselves cannot intuit. Ironically, Danto accepts
the notion of style as the conduit for artistic meaning, which compels Plato to ban
the poets from the polis. In his dialogue with Ion, Socrates compares the inspired
performances of Ion to the Heraclean loadstone, or a magnet, which, as we know,
will attract iron rings (Plato 1960: 533d–536d). Socrates argues that like the magnetic
power of the stone, what is imparted upon the words or images of art through divine
inspiration can be transferred to others. An iron ring, having no magnetic power of
its own, is transformed through contact with the magnet. By touching the magnet,
it receives the magnetic force, and a chain is created, with one ring transferring the
force to the next. Socrates tells Ion that the poet, and the rhapsode in this dialogue, has
divine inspiration. The rhapsode, reciting the poet’s work, is possessed by the poet’s
enchantment in the same manner that the magnet bestows the iron ring with its power.
The rhapsodists, like the iron rings, are able to transmit this divine dispensation to
others. The last ring on the chain is the spectator, where the transfer of the poet’s
energy stops. Danto’s example of the fugue machine reflects how closely his account of
artistic style resembles Plato’s. It was claimed that Bach had invented a ‘fugue-writing
machine’, which could produce fugues according to a formula. Danto speculates that
if such a machine existed, its products would possess no style (1981: 203). Without
the unmediated presence of style, a craft would result that possessed no transfiguring
power. There would be nothing present in the work to interpret.
Danto proposes that the metaphor is the medium through which art transmits its
rhetorical ‘intention’. But Danto’s theory of how artists create metaphors out of the
gift of style does not account for the critical role metaphor plays in the artwork’s ability
to effect a reaction in the audience. The employment and creation of the metaphor
is tied to the ‘cultural competency’ and the ability of artists to read the subtext of
historical meaning. The transmission of the intention through the elliptical enthymeme
is a notion found in the work of Aristotle, who sought to refute Plato’s theory of art
by showing that art was not created through inspiration – its power not transmitted
as the loadstone’s power – but was a techne¯ capable of evoking a practical effect on
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the audience. The comparison of the artwork to the enthymeme is compelling. It
provides an avenue through which one can understand the link between the effect art
has on the audience and the cultural realm from which the artist draws. But this claim
requires more than the artist’s unselfconscious revelation of meaning to sustain the
connection. It also requires the artist to craft the enthymeme such that the metaphor
evokes a response from the audience, bringing to light the artwork’s meaning.
Discussing how the great poets elevate language above its standard usage, bringing
greater clarity to the topic, Aristotle maintains that ‘their greatest asset is a capacity
for metaphor’. In line with Danto’s claim, Aristotle continues, ‘this alone cannot be
acquired from another, and is a sign of natural gifts’ (Aristotle 1999: 1459a, 5–8).
But the power of the poet to create metaphor comes from the capacity ‘to discern
similarities’. In Rhetoric, reiterating assertions he made in Poetics, Aristotle states that
the power of the poem, as that of prose, comes from the metaphor, which ‘cannot be
learnt from anyone else’ (Aristotle 1926: 1405a, 9). Nonetheless, even if one has the
gift of creating metaphor, if it is to be effective the gift must be employed appropriately.
‘This will be secured by observing due proportion; otherwise there will be a lack of
propriety, because it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are most evident’
(Aristotle 1926: 1405a, 9–10). Regardless of whether we accept in total Aristotle’s
rules of deployment, we can agree that the successful usage is achieved through the apt
and conscious application of the metaphor, which involves knowledge of the audience
and its placement in the context that best affords the desired effect. It is clear that
practical usage of rhetoric found in metaphor, the same power the artwork utilises
to affect the audience, is a techne¯ requiring an interrelationship between the artist and
the audience. Because the conveyance of style that Danto describes is one-way, this
aspect of metaphoric usage is not included in Danto’s account of style and rhetoric.
The pour-soi notion of style that Danto adapts from Sartre’s notion of unreflective-
consciousness (être-pour-soi) relies on a struggle, the overcoming of the other, for
realisation. Even Sartre seemed to understand this state of being was impossible,
for the one-way model he envisioned was fundamentally unsatisfying (hell is other
people). The self is transformed through the recognition that one exists in the gaze
of the other (Danto 1975: 121–25). For Danto, the intention of the artist evokes the
interpretation of the other, and in stepping into the metaphor they are transfigured,
not overcome. The metaphor is fundamentally interactive, and through the artwork,
the audience is invited to interpret what the artist receives from history. But the
model of unselfconscious style leaves little room for transformation or change in the
transmission of culture through art.
Art does something. The end of art’s disenfranchisement, as Danto sees it,
comes with the art of post-history when the task of art is separated from the task
of philosophy. As the era of art closes, philosophy can play a role in art’s definition
because its historical narrative is complete. This implies, however, that art made after
the end of art’s history is free of philosophical interference. Artists plumb the meaning
of history and evince it in their art. Philosophy will have no role in artistic creation, but
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the philosopher-critic is needed to interpret the meaning embodied in the work. In the
era of post-history, for Danto, art is free, but philosophy’s disenfranchisement of art
had a long history. Philosophy’s marginalisation of art reduces art’s status by arguing
that either it does nothing or that it is irrational. To overcome this, Danto asserts it
must be recognised that art does something. In this, Danto acknowledges Plato’s fear of
art’s power without succumbing to his desire to banish art from the realm of intelligible
reality (Danto 1986). However, Danto’s account of the generation of metaphor
through the unconscious medium of style minimises art’s potential for effecting change
through its meaning. The lack of control artists have over their gift, as Danto describes
it, would actually support Plato’s fear of the artists’ irrational power rather than allay
them. In Danto’s theory of style, the artist’s embodiment of meaning underwrites
an uncritical ontological existence, which relies on an unmediated connection to
stylistic revelation to maintain its essential distance from the history in which the
artwork is embedded. Certainly, artists possess a gift, for without their superior
intuitions, their works would not raise art – visual, poetic or any another medium – to
the elevated status achieved through the artists’ transfiguration. But without contesting
artists’ superior intuitions, removing the stipulation of style’s impenetrable metaphoric
generation would make room for a formulation of artistic creation that better supports
a notion of art capable of evoking critical self-reflection. Each new interpretation of
the art object, according to Danto, yields a new artwork (I(o)=W) (1981: 125).
This account of art’s essential and interpretable nature flows out of Danto’s notion of
embodied meaning. This notion of embodied meaning is fundamentally Hegelian, as
is the notion of style that is transmitted unconsciously through the artist. But with a
theory of art that is underwritten by a narrative framework, rather than a Hegelian
absolute, Danto’s claim that the artwork is essentially an interpreted medium belies
the narrow ontological definition of the artwork’s stylistic provenance.4 The infusion
of an unmediated style into the artwork truncates the interpretive activity, the critical
subjectivity, of the audience. The Sartrean model of style that Danto adopts (being-
for-the-self and being-for-others) does reflect the recognition of the other. This is seen
in Danto’s claim that the artwork must be interpreted to exist as art. But this notion
of style and interpretation is based on a model that understands dominance to be the
aim of one form of consciousness (pour-soi) over another (pour-autrui). Translated into
Danto’s notion of style, intention, and audience interpretation, this could account
for an aesthetic transformation, but it would be ‘blind luck’. ‘Arbitrary’, as Danto
referred to it in terms of future predictions. The process through which art comes
into being, as an interaction among artists, artwork, and beholders, must at some level
be aimed if it is to manifest a concept that can take its place in the artworld. Without
the artist’s creative reason, the narrative framework cannot carry the Hegelian spirit
that endows history with meaning. Aristotle held the poem to be more philosophical
than historical writing because within it was a universal not found in the ordinary
sequence of events. Though each historical period is unique, it is the artist, not
history, manifesting art with meaning. It is my contention that mind is imparted to
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the aesthetic medium through style. Thus, style evokes an activity that engages the
concepts of the artworld through the interpretive act. If the style merely transmits
some effect that dissipates in aesthetic reception, then the audience’s interpretation,
like the iron rings without the magnet, could produce no new artwork. The magnetic
force does in some way transfigure, and it dominates what it touches with the force
of its style. The nature of the interplay between artist and beholder may, in some
ways, as Sartre imagined the relation among egos, be agonistic. But the conflict,
the difference in inner representations we perceive through art, is capable of driving
thought and interpretation further. The revelation that comes through the play of text
and countertext, through the interaction of style, artwork, and audience, opens the
way for future understanding of oneself and others. This openness cannot be defined
merely by the one-way dispensation of style.
Style and theory. Danto agrees that Plato’s depiction of Ion was unfair. Ion does
have knowledge of his audience, of what would sway them one way or another, but
it was a knowledge Ion could not pass on to others. It could have been that Ion’s
heightened performance of Homeric verse was not due to his ability, but to the power
of Homer’s works. After all, the transferral of poetic power does rely on the potency of
the initial poem, and Homer’s works held so much more than the other poets of Ion’s
day (Danto 2007b: 16–18). Arguably, the great artist is in possession of a knowledge
that is not easily transferred. This supports in some measure Danto’s belief that the
artist is unaware of his style. But this is not the aspect of Danto’s notion of style I
challenge, nor do I question Danto’s claim that the style of the artist provides a unique
stamp of the manner and meaning of the time, providing a way to differentiate the
theoretical embodiment of works of one era from another. What is questioned here is
the level and type of interaction that occurs with the audience and what it is that artists
transmit through their style. Agreeing with Danto that the artist’s style manifests the
imprint of the times, an account of style is needed that goes beyond the artist’s un-self-
reflective physiognomic projection. Not only is Danto’s unmediated notion of style
insufficient to account for the powerful notion of metaphor he argues is central to the
work of art, it seems inadequate to carry forward the concepts of the artworld that
unfold from the artist’s activity.
It would seem that Danto needs an account of style that allows him to maintain
the line he draws between the philosophical universal and the particular activity
of history. The narrative framework Danto employs provides a ‘cognitive reference
system’ for the members of a given society at a given time (Habermas 1987: 136).
This frame of reference provides the ‘totality’ of ways that the world can be talked
about and what stories can be told. When an artwork is created, in Danto’s eyes, it
forms a metaphor that others can step into (1986: 154). This metaphor goes beyond
the allusion to specific events that occur within the narrative frame of reference,
requiring for its creation a theoretical perspective that refers to the narrative system
as a whole. But, recalling Danto’s claims from his Analytical Philosophy of History, he
holds that the theoretical perspective used to project a narrative structure beyond a
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particular sequence of events is invalid. All such attempts are arbitrary expressions,
and accordingly their value in guiding one’s life amount to little more than prophecy.
I argue that Danto has made an error here.5 Through the theoretical perspective,
works of art gain the capacity to present aspects of the lived world that the audience
apprehends without explicitly using. If a theoretical perspective were not employed,
the metaphor could not embody a gesture of general human interest and could not
succeed in manifesting the style of the time, leaving nothing for audiences to interpret.
Aristotle argued that artists do have knowledge of what they create; thus, artistic
creation is a techne¯. This is not to say that the power of art is clearly palpable, that
the creative process is a purely rational one. After all, public scrutiny would dissolve
art’s mystery – the rationalistic Socratic notion of what good art ought to be could
well have led to what Nietzsche argued was the death of tragedy. Though the message
of art and the process of its creation is opaque, not subject to strict demonstration,
it is not unseeingly conjured; the craft of artists entails knowing how to wield their
‘divine dispensation’. Aristotle held that humans enjoy the interpretation of art, using
reason to understand and recognise what the artist had created (Aristotle 1999: 1448b,
14–19). If we accept that artists have knowledge of their craft, it follows that when they
communicate to the audience, it engages them in a way that at some level is theoretical.
Danto’s response to a commentator who asserted that he had reduced Warhol’s style
to his aura was that Warhol’s style was in his ideas. Referring to Warhol’s Brillo Boxes,
Danto felt that there were ‘no specialWarhol touches on any of the cartons. The touch,
if anywhere, was in the idea, and so invisible’ (Danto 2007b: 22). Artists – whether
poets, painters or musicians – are not philosophers. They may utilise the theoretical
attitude unconsciously through their style. But through their style, artists use their
knowledge of the narrative framework, and their audiences’ understanding of it.
This allows the presentation of the narrative reference system –which members of
a society inhabit from within – outside the context of its everyday employment. In this way,
audiences discern the indiscernible. When the narrative structure of the lived world
is revealed in this way, something important is disclosed to beholders, allowing them
the opportunity to reflect critically on their cultural pre-understandings. This act of
reflection is implicitly theoretical. Echoing Kant, the aesthetic idea is encountered
when the faculties of mind are employed for purposes other than cognition. Artists
manifest aesthetically the narrative reference system that is always in use such that
a general understanding of the normally imperceptible framework emerges through
their style. Hence, the theory in style is implicit in every artistic metaphor. The process
of metaphoric creation entails a dialogue that relies on the interaction of artists and
audience. Though artists may not explicitly cognise their intent, they make art to
achieve some effect, and this process cannot be completely outside of consciousness.
The opaque communication offered by the artist may work in the same manner as
rhetoric. And though the power of rhetoric should be feared, as Plato claimed, its uses
go beyond that of deception. The rhetorical power of art is able to provide an opaque
metaphor, using its elliptical properties to intimate concepts that prosaic expression
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cannot achieve. I argue though, that achieving such an effect through the opacity of the
artistic medium is not possible without the conscious efforts of artists to understand
and interact with their audience and their history. Sartre held that freedom is less a
capacity to choose than choosing to choose. Commenting on this, Danto applies this
to style, speculating that the choice one makes constitutes one’s style. It is the choice
of the kind of life one wills that pervades all other choices, and this can be perceived as
style. ‘It is that in each choice I do more than choose a specific course of action; rather,
I choose a style of choosing. So the original choice is made in every choice’ (Danto
1975: 137). Though I agree that the choice will pervade other aspects of one’s actions,
the choice is not impenetrable. I would say, to the contrary, that it is through their
understanding of the concepts and meaning of their time, and their ability to revise
these, that artists project a theoretical action in their style.
Notes
1. See chapter XIII, ‘Historical Understanding: The Problem of Other Periods’.
2. In Daniel Dennett’s The Philosophical Lexicon, a collection consisting of puns based on philosophers’
names, Dennett creates an entry referring to Danto as the ‘arthurdantist’: ‘One who straightens the
teeth of exotic dogmas’ (Dennett 2008). Danto, often referring to Dennett’s lexical innovation, appears
to accept this humorous depiction, conceding that he has sought to straighten a few of the ‘exotic’
philosophies of the historical canon for, in his words, an analytical audience.
3. ‘We have already said that the enthymeme ( ) is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and
in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms; for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far
back nor should it include all the steps of the argument’ (Aristotle 1926: II, 22, 1395b).
4. For further elaboration, see Snyder 2010.
5. See Jürgen Habermas’ discussion of narrative structure and the ‘hermeneutical point of departure’
(1977: 346 –50).
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